Unfortunately there has been little critical examination of these assumptions. Werner COl1Ze's description on-Endenburg as "the most populist [volksUimlich J personification of the monarchy," with the stress put on tbe novel reworking of old clements, has largely gone unnoticed.
12 Perhaps because provincial burghers, the mainstay of Hindenburg's electorate, are taken to be politically passive and sentimentally nostalgic, allowing themselves to be harnessed by the same people again and again, "for the tenth time, for the twelfth time," in Theodor Wolff's mocking words, they are not very interesting to historians. 13 There are, however, powerful reasons to reexplore Hindenburg's appeal.
Hindenburg's election anticipated the novel and dramatic growth of the National Socialists. As Jurgen Falter and Dirk Hanisch have recently shown, the Hindenburg vote in 1925 is one of the best predictors of the Nazi vote in September 1930 and July 193214 This strong correlation alone docs not make Hindenburg voters early Nazis or Nazi voters diehard monarchists; social combinations do not of themselves indicate political motivations. But it does suggest that the broad social coalition supporting the Nazis had assembled before and was not solely a product of economic hard times in the early 1930S. Evidently antisocialist Sammlungspolitik or politics of unity---the illusive dream of the German Right-could succeed under the proper conditions.
A local study of Hindenburg festivity in the predominantly Protestant north German region of Lower Saxony reveals that while support for I-Endenburg turned out to be broad and enthusiastic there is little reason to believe it resolutely monarchist or reminiscent of prewar nationalism. The accents ofPotsdam and the gestures ofthe Hohenzollerns were remarkably muted. Indeed, since the November Revolution nationalist endeavors displayed an increasingly populist political style that eschewed the social rigidity and official choreography of the Wilhelmine period. The way in which Hindenburg was celebrated by the nationalist Biirgertul1l underscored the changing requirements of 12. Erdmann and Schulze. Weinwr: Selbstprrisgabe eiller Demokratie, 47· 13. Berliller Tagcblatt, 110. 197, 27 Apr. 1925, quoted in Schulze, Weimar, 296. 14. Jiirgen W Falter and Dirk Hanisch, "Die Anfalligkeit von Arbeitern gegenliber der NSDAP bei dm Reichstagswahlen 192k-1933," Archiv.fiir Sozialgeschichte 26 (I 9k6), and Falter. "The Two Hindcnburg Elections of 1925 and 1932: A Total Reversal of Voter Coalitions," in this issue.
right-wing politics in postwar Germany. The presidential campaign in spring 1925 and Hindenburg ceremonial in the years that followed draw attention to the social breadth and also to the political agility and aggressive bearing that came to distinguish Weimar nationalism. This paper thus contributes to the growing literature reexamining politics in the 1920S, a decade which is reviewed here not so much as a period of stalemate between the old Germany and the new or between monarchism and the republic, but as one of profound realignment in middle-class party loyalties and reformulation in political styles and capacities. 15 There is a neglected prehistory to National Socialism; the Hindenburg campaign indicates that the popular insurgency that brought the Nazis to prominence and power was neither the exclusive creature of Hitler or Goebbels or specifically Nazi organizational talents nor simply the consequence of the Great Depression. "Radical nationalism" was a much more durable and prevalent feature of the postwar years than has been conventionally believed. 16 Hindenburg's election confirmed the rightward drift in Weimar politics that had begun as early as June 1920, when strong advances by the right-of-center German People's Party (DVP) and the resolutely antirepublican German National People's Party (DNVP) registered public fury over the Versailles settlement and renewed fears about working-class unrest that had mounted after the March 1920 Kapp Putsch. The fortunes of the nationalist Right continued to improve during the chaotic years of hyperinflation. While the liberal parties, the German Democratic Party (DDP) and even Gustav Stresemann's DVP, lost momentum, a host of anti-Semitic and volkisch parties, including Hitler's National Socialists, attracted considerable support during the difficult years 1923 and 1924. As late as May 1924, when a margin of economic stability had returned, the Nazis garnered 6.5 percent of the national vote, somewhat more in Protestant areas such as Lower Saxony. More mainstream nationalist groupings such as the veterans' association Stahlhelm enjoyed great popularity as well and established permanent branches in neighborhoods across Germany. 17 With the May 1924 Reichstag elections, the ultranationalist DNVP emerged as the largest party in Germany, with some 20 percent ofthe vote. Weimar Democrats, by contrast, almost disappeared from view, having garnered only 5.6 percent, down from 18.6 percent inJanuary 19 I 9. Ecstatic nationalists took these indications to be ofa single piece. Newspapermen lauded the patriotic spirit of the paramilitary associations and without distinction lumped these and DVP, DNVP, and volkisch voters together as a recognizable "national opposition," assembled under the black-white-red flag of the Kaiserreich to oppose the Weimar Republic. 18 The swelling vote totals for the nationalist parties did not translate into automatic nationalist union, however. Bitter conflicts divided volkisch activists from German Nationalists and persisting resentment over Stresemann's late-summer 1923 coalition with the Social Democrats, his termination of passive resistance in the French-occupied Ruhr, and his conciliatory foreign policy kept the two largest nationalist parties, the DVP and the DNVP, apart. In addition, the hardships of hyperinflation and the fiscal rigors of the stabilization that followed led various disaffected middle-class interest groups to launch their own political slates, particularly in local elections. Although support for splinter parties such as the Business Party or creditor parties remained limited in 1924, their appearance indicated how virulent hostilities among embattled middle-class constituents had become. In these circumstances of political difference and social and economic resentment, it took months of negotiations and a second Reichstag election on 7 December 1924 before a right-of-center Biirgerblock, joined by the DVP, DNVP, and the Catholic Center (but, significantly, not the DDP), was finally assembled inJanuary 1925 under the chancellorship of Hans Luther.
The fragile nature of the governing coalition was underscored during February and March, when parliamentary leaders and elder nationalist statesmen, constituting themselves as a Reichsblock, disagreed Despite the infighting in Berlin that surrounded his nomination, Jarres's candidacy stirred considerable excitement in bourgeois neighborhoods. Although hopes for a united antisocialist front crumbled once the Catholic Center and German Democrats fielded their own candidates, who campaigned alongside Erich LudendortT, the volkisch candidate; the Social Democratic Minister President of Prussia, Otto Braun; and the Communist leader, Ernst Thalmann, the Reichsblock cobbled together a broad nationalist combination. At the local level, most ofthe nonsocialist, Protestant community supportedJarres. Passionate differences between liberals and conservatives over Stresemann's foreign policy, the acceptability of reforming the republican state from within, and economic and fiscal matters were laid to rest, at least for a time. In Braunschweig, for example, representatives of the DVP and DNVP as well as middle-class splinter parties constituted the local Reichsblock. In addition, spokesmen for artisans, retailers, farmers, industrialists, and Christian workers joined, as did leaders of the patriotic organizations. 20 At a time when a half-dozen specialinterest parties threatened to make inroads into the long-established liberal and conservative electorates, and in Braunschweig had already fielded separate lists in Landtag and municipal elections, and when the pro-business policies of Chancellor Hans Luther unsettled Christian workers, dispossessed savers, and small tradespeople, the combination in support of Jarres was a noteworthy accomplishment. Given the centrifugal forces in Weimar politics and the already wide Held of candidates, the Reichsblock coalition could easily have flown apart.
For all the sturdy support he received from Protestant liberals and conservatives, Jarres had only a slim chance of winning the second HindenbI1~R'5 1925 Election round once Social Democrats rallied around the respected Center Party candidate, Wilhelm Marx, who now campaigned in the name of the republican Volkshlock. Jarres was a well-liked party leader, but not a commanding public figure who could draw needed support from conservative Bavarian Catholics or wayward democrats. I-lindenburg seemed to offer a way out of this predicament. Once he was persuaded to run in place ofJarres, opposition to his candidacy melted away. Gustav Stresemann and other liberal leaders, who resented the cavalier way Jarres had been treated and who worried about the effects a Hindenburg presidency would have on the republic's foreign policy, muffied their objections. The nationalist enthusiasm that surged once Hindenburg entered the race also put to rest the fcars of those patriots who balked at pulling the aged hero of Tannenberg through the dirt of Weimar politics. 21 In the two weeks before the election, the Reichsblock oversaw unprecedented political activism which mustered even the "most quiescent" burghers, as Bad Harzburg's newspaper noted. Often for the first time since the war, small-town burghers found themselves swept up in the passions of public politics. I-Endenburg electioneering resembled civic work; choirs, athletic clubs, riflery societies, guilds and other business groups, Christian organizations, and housewives' associations all played leading roles. Even Social Democrats, who had the resources of an impressive organizational machine at their disposal and generally entered Weimar elections better prepared than their nationalist opponents, conceded that this time the presidential campaign had linked "the bourgeoisie" together in a "great chain of reaction," down "to the last nun. "22 It was male paramilitary and veterans' groups which figured most prominently in election work. Stahlhelm comrades, for example, busily leafletted neighborhoods and outlying villages, stood guard at rallies, and, on election day, drove voters to polling places. The Stahlhelm also organized the exuberant parades and demonstrations that took place across the provinces. In I-Endenburg's adopted city of Hanover, for example, veterans marched in the first ranks of a tumul--· tuous parade the Sunday before the election. It was the only time that Hindenburg made a personal appearance in the campaign and the city dressed itself up accordingly. On this "I-Endenburg Sunday," Hanover was draped with black-white-red bunting; burghers flew thousands of imperial flags from their homes and apartments, beginning the political custom of unfurling partisan loyalties and counting flags to measure party passions which would continue until 1933. Accustomed to the red flags, folksy garlands, and other visible political adornments of the socialist movement since the tum of the century, nationalists must have been heartened as they surveyed Hanover wrapped in patriotic bunting. 23 Hanover sounded patriotic as well; military bands blared throughout the provincial capital. Two hours passed before Hanover's patriots and veterans completed the parade circuit. 24 In the weeks before the 26 April election, smaller towns held gatherings that were, in proportion, equally impressive.
Not attached to any particular party, the Stahlhelm, along with the Young German Order, gave pro-Hindenburg assemblies a bipartisan, above-party spirit. Indeed, Reichsblock leaders in Berlin were anxious to avoid giving local party politicians a major role in the campaign and urged that municipal notables and chairmen of recreational clubs preside over campaign events. Hindenburg himself said that he did not want anything to do with parties. The emphasis was on bourgeois unity, and it was significant that the largest bourgeois parties, the DVP and DNVP, played only subordinate roles in accomplishing that unity. More and more, it was social clubs and patriotic associations which joined together to provide vigorous examples ofnationalist renewal. 25 The Stahlhelm, in particular, presented an example of busy political activity which burghers had previously only admired with unease in the Social Democrats. However, by the time the Hindenburg election was held, the political capacities ofnationalist burghers had improved considerably, an important development that has generally been overlooked. 26 Now "Germany not only has a mass organization ofthe Left 23. On political adornment, see George Mosse, The Nationalization of the Aiasses: Political Symbolism and AI"ss Alovements ill Gef11lmty from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich (New York, 1975) , particularly 162-82; and also Vernon Lidtke, The Altenwtiw Culture: Socialist Labor ill Imperial Germally (New York, 1985 Politics and Nazism: M"'burg, 1880 -1935 (Chapel Hill, 1986 1927.27 Posters and flags went up and excitement mounted as election Sunday, 26 April, approached. Both the republican Volksblock and the nationalist Reichsblock were confident of victory and held exuberant market-square rallies throughout Germany on the eve of the election. Once the polls closed at six the next everling, anxious crowds gathered in front ofnewspaper offices to await the results as they came in, were tabulated, and then publicly posted. An early lead by Marx kept tension high until midnight, by which time slower reports from more conservative districts east of the Elbe River made it clear than I-Endenburg had won a narrow victory.2R
The election plainly exposed the sharp division of Weimar Germany. In the second round of elections, in which Hindcnburg faced off against Wilhelm Marx and the Communist Ernst Thalmann, who remained in the race as a spoiler, German voters divided almost evenly; 48 percent voted for Hindenburg, 45 for Marx. Neither the \vclcome onset of more stable and more prosperous economic conditions after the end of inflation in 1924 nor the foreclosure of armed threats to republican rule changed what at the local level was an increasingly strict divide between democratic Left and nationalist Right. That the Catholic vote split between Marx and Hindcnburg, whom the conservative Bavarian People's Party endorsed, and many workers supported Thalmann only reinforced the solidity of the nonsocialist, Protestant electorate which had enthusiastically backed Hindenburg.
The day after the election, Hindenburg's supporters took to the streets in unprecedented numbers, confident that with Hindenburg's victory, the advance of socialism and republican rule had been decisively halted. In Goslar, a town of some 25,000 inhabitants which had a substantial working-class minority, a victory parade organized by the Stahlhelm, regimental groups, and the Men's Gymnastic League, led hundreds of burghers through the narrow streets of the medieval town to the market place. There the nationalist editor of the local paper, August Wilhelm Silgradt, congratulated Germans for making their way out ofthe labyrinth of revolution and onto "the straight path of honor. "29 In Helmstedt, patriotic associations, riflery clubs, and student fraternities, with flags and bands, marched in "great numbers," followed by enthusiastic townspeople. Across Germany, burghers decorated their homes with black-white-red banners and rallied around local war monuments or Bismarck columns to demonstrate Hindenburg's triumph. The German Right was brimming with confidence and dearly gathering political momentum. 30 Often enough, Hindenburg celebrants turned against Social Democrats. The flip side to nationalist unity was antisocialist vigilance. As if a single election had overturned the balance of domestic power, Social Democrats increasingly found themselves under physical attack. Hindenburg revelers in Bremen marched provocatively past the local trade union house and, on the day ofHindenburg's inauguration, beat up socialists milling outside. 31 The day after the election, crowds in Gottingen gathered in front of the home of Social Democratic Reichstag deputy Schiller, who was also editor of the local socialist paper, to shout curses and smash windows. Fistfights with leftists also marked celebrations in Schoningen and Gandersheim. 32 This sort of rough curbside politics did not assume the proportions of SA violence later in the 1930S, but it showed a new belligerence among nationalists and confirmed once more the sharp polarization of German communities. Social Democrats, in any case, remarked on the rising threat that the insurgent Stahlhelm posed throughout the provinces; their paramilitary force, the Reichsbanner, was apparently no match, and socialist organizational efforts accordingly suffered: attacks on workers went unpunished; small-town sympathizers grew increasingly reluctant to join socialist dubs; and more and more tavern-owners, watchful of the political tide, refused anymore to rent out their back rooms for meetings. The retreat ofthe socialists, which William Sheridan Allen and others chart in the 19305, began already in the mid- 19205. 33 of Goslar politics is provided by Lieselotte Krull. Wahlen und Wahh'erhalten in Coslar LVi:ihrer,d der Weiftlarer Republik (Goslar, 1982) . 30. Hannoversche Kuner, no. 99, 29 Apr. 1925; Harzsche Zeitzmg, no. IOO, 28 Apr. 1925; Candersheimer Kreisblatt, no. 99, 29 Apr. 1925; and Schi; nitlger Zeitung, no. 98, 28 Apr. 1925. 31 33· See, for example, the assessments in Braunschweig's~{Jlkifreutld, no. lOS, 7 May 1925; no. 280, 30 Nov. 1927; and no. [3, 16Jan. 1928 , and William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure ofPoLVer: The Experience ofa Single Cerman Town, 1922 -1945 , rev. ed. (New York, 1984 .
The 1925 presidential elections revealed the extent to which Protestant burghers came to identify themselves as partisans of avowedly bl¥rgerlich political groupings. Municipal elections, held throughout Prussia in November 1924, had already registered the popularity of local BiirgerblO'cke and the precipitant decline of willing mediators such as the German Democrats, who generally declined to join explicitly antisocialist coalitions and consequently saw their political authority evaporate. Socialists and burghers glared at each other over a martial divide. After I-Endenburg's election, one Social Democratic journalist surveyed the street of Oelber, his Lower Saxon hometown. He named names and provided addresses: Steigertahl, the village pastor, ostentatiously displayed the partisan black-white-red banner of the Reichsblock. Imperial politics apparently ran in the family; Steigertahl's son, along with Dassler and the locksmith Muller, had ripped republican ribbons off the local monument. Living at house number 70, the widow of Social Democrat Fricke also flew the imperial colors. At the top of the street, at number I, the farmer Heinrich Grasshoff was a notorious Stahlhelm activist. 34 After the Hindenburg election, Oelber's townspeople, like Germans elsewhere, took sides with greater ease and observed a stricter partisanship. Outside the largest cities, there was little confusion about social roles and political orientations. This was the case in Lower Saxony, but also in traditionally democratic regions, as Ernst Glaeser's novel about provincial life in Weimar-era Wiirttemberg, The Last Civilian, makes clear. 35 The relative political civility which still prevailed in the mid-I920s should not obscure the deep social divide that split German communities.
It is important to emphasize that the grass roots combination supporting Hindenburg was not simply a fair-weather coalition uniting around a single candidate in a runoff election but breaking apart once the daily business of parliamentary interest politics resumed. Over the coming seasons, burghers assembled again and again to displdy the nationalist union that Hindenburg had tugged together. JLIst as the birthday of the kaiser or Bismarck had occasioned patriotic ceremony before the war, so did Hindenburg's birthday on 2 October after the war. Commemorations to honor the president were already held pri- vately in I925 and I926, but when Hindenburg turned eighty in I927, bourgeois neighborhoods erupted in festivity.
The celebration ofHindenburg's birthday in I927 closely resembled the political campaign in I925. Reichsblock confronted Volksblock. Unless they served in an official capacity as mayor or Landrat, Social Democrats refused to join ceremonies to honor the president, in Aurich claiming that local governments had never commemorated Ebert, even at his death, or in Goslar decrying the ubiquitous imperial banners, though they acknowledged Hindenburg's fealty to the constitution. 36 Socialist and Communist veterans' groups and workingclass choirs and athletic clubs simply stayed home on Hindenburg Day. German Democrats and Catholics had more mixed feelings. They praised Hindenburg, and perhaps even felt an emotional tug walking past the hundreds of black-white-red flags that decorated German towns on 2 October, but surely repudiated Hindenburg's most boisterous nationalist supporters. Even so, in the "Golden Twenties," Weimar lacked a holiday or institution or public figure that could overcome, even intermittently, the deep political hostilities in the community; citizens contested the colors of the flag, ignored Constitution Day ceremonies, and elected a president who revealed their fundamental differences more than he concealed them.
The fractured civic culture of the nation contrasted with the recurrent sense of unity and confidence that the Protestant BUrgerturn demonstrated. City councils with a nationalist majority officially sponsored local Hindenburg Days and, as in Goslar, allocated funds and permitted patriotic speeches to be made from the steps leading to city hall. But it was ordinary members of neighborhood social clubs and patriotic associations who played the leading roles, organizing parades and rallies, putting on athletic tournaments and talent contests, and outfitting the streets in black-white-red bunting. Goslar's organizing committee, for example, composed the very picture of bourgeois unity: local party politicians joined Stahlhelmers, the Committee of Guilds and the chamber of commerce worked with the German Civil Servants' League and the German National Union of Commercial Employees, and the Protestant churches cooperated with the Catholic parish. 37 In the face of fractious party politics and querulous special interests, which scarred small communities such as Goslar as much as larger towns, Hindenburg ceremony offered burghers from all stations the opportunity to publicly display a collective political identity.
Not until the last days ofJanuary 1933 would the enthusiasm and confidence of burghers be pitched as high as it was on 2 October 1927. In tiny Esbeck, Hindenburg supporters assembled in the village's largest room, the Nuthmannschen Hall, which was decorated for the occasion with evergreen and imperial flags. Local authorities rose to say a few words, but the focus of the commemoration was on local clubs: one after the other, the village choir sang; the gymnastic association tumbled; and members of the dramatic society read poems. 38 To honor Hindenburg, athletes in Rotenburg on the Wiimme climbed on each other to form a human pyramid four stories high on which assistants hung huge blown-up photographs of the president. After this gymnastic marvel, Rotenburg's choirs provided less strenuous musical entertainment. 39 Although the scale of festivity was more grand in larger towns, the grass roots spirit remained the same. In Osnabruck, for example, hundreds of schoolchildren and members of the Stahlhelm, the Young German Order, regimental groups, riflery clubs, athletic associations, singing societies, and guilds arrayed themselves in a huge parade through the city center. 40 Even in Berlin, where hundreds of thousands of patriots climbed into special buses and clogged the subways to line Unter den Linden and Friedrichstrasse, the route of Hindenburg's motorcade, distinctive uniforms, hats, and pins identified club members. Stahlhelm, Boy Scouts, the German National Union ofCommercial Employees, DDP youth groups, trollcymen -all formed a colorful chain of nonsocialist associationallife in the giant metropolis. 41 Stahlhelm members could be found in the middle of the celebrations again and again, hanging up bunting, organizing parades, leading neighbors. Their leadership roles at the very center of civic activism underscored the Bii~gertum's new militancy.
Overshadowed by subsequent events, the scale and reach ofHindenburg commemoration is largely forgotten. But Hindenburg's eigh-37. Sec the files collected in Goslar's Stadtarchiv, RR I 29/8/ Ill. Zeitzmg, no. 232. 4 Oct. 1~)27· 39. Rotenburger Anzeiger. no. 9772, 3 Oct. 1927· 40. Ostlabriickner Tageblatt, no. 13341,2 Oct. 1927 . 41. Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, no. 462, 3 Oct. 1927 tieth birthday was a genuine nationalist coming out-a massive declaration of political resolution and political accomplishment. It was this black-white-red spectacle which impressed observers. Newspapers published all sorts of statistics to take the measure of the crowds in Berlin. Over 200,000 visitors arrived in the city on Hindenburg Day, one report estimated. And whereas on a normal Sunday, 350, 000 Berliners used buses and 4°0,000 took the subway, on Hindenburg Sunday the numbers leaped to 500,000 and 600,000 respectively.42 The idea that the Deutschlandlied was being sung in thousands of festivals in neighborhoods and villages across Germany and beyond charmed even the acerbic, extreme right-wing newspaper, Deutsche Zeitung. 43 Whereas burghers had rarely marched openly in the streets before 1924, leaving public arenas to the more active Social Democrats, preferring to assemble indoors under the auspices of traditional party leaders or staid Burgher League functionaries, Hindenburg's election marked a turning point. A careful reading of local political events in Lower Saxony indicates that burghers came to display openly the black-white-red flag and, led by new and aggressive organizations such as the Stahlhelm, to march through the streets and hold open-air assemblies more frequently. As James Diehl argues, the Stahlhelm, in particular, was widely credited for adopting more assertive workingclass tactics and taking to the streets more readily. Mobilization in public became a vital measure for the political vitality of the German Right.
Schb-'zinger
44 As a consequence, Hindenburg festivity left a palpable sense ofstrength and unity: "Germany is moving forward again," concluded the editors of the influential Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. 45 The Hindenburg celebrations remained a model for successful political mobilization. Already in spring 1925 because it was too much a creature of a single party, thc DNVP, Loebell argued that the presidential campaign had shown that the major nonsocialist parties and interest groups could "overcome their partisan perspectives." On that basis, they should work more closely to revise the Weimar constitution and restore the black-white-red colors to the national flag. 46 Loebell's proposal earned substantial support from local party leaders in both the DVP and DNVP. After all, wrote one German Nationalist from Osnabruck, Hindenburg's victory proved what nationalist unity could achieve. 47 Indeed, the Reichsblock slate won a major victory in June 1928 regional elections in the traditionally democratic state of Oldenburg; the DVP and DNVP would never do so well there again. Although Loebell's efforts were frustrated by party leaders determined to protect their own turf, the question of antisocialist unity persisted. Newspaper editors such as Goslar's August Wilhelm Silgradt repeatedly held Hindenburg celebrations up as the happy example of cooperation. 48 The differences between the major bourgeois parties were "unnatural," argued Braunschweig's LandeszeitunLI!' which warmly endorsed proposals to enforce more cooperation. 49 In sum·-mer 1926, for example, Karl Jarres and Baron Wilhelm von Gayl, who were spokesmen in the upper chamber of the Prussian Landtag for the DVP and DNVP respectively, issued an appeal for closer collaboration between the two parties that won wide public acclaim. Stahlhelm efforts to impose a nationalist agenda on the nonsocialist parties in regional elections in Saxony in 1927 and in Braunschweig in 1928 earned applause as well. By the end of the decade, more and more burghers expressed confidence in the goal of nationalist unity and political renewal, something that I--lindenburg had made more credible, but they also came to see nationalist associations, which enforced a political fellowship that eluded the traditional parties, as the best means of achieving that goal. 50 The shift away from the traditional parties and political notables and the focus on community activism is significant. It points to an increasingly populist style and self-reliant aspect to bourgeois politics in the 1920S. Hindenburg was as popular as he was not simply because he expressed political resentments against the Allies, the Social Democrats, and the Weimar Republic but also because he oversaw a reconstitution of the nationalist community, particularly on the local level. Nationalism was experienced differently in the Weimar years. In contrast to the officious ceremony of the Wilhelmine era, in which social rank and military protocol dominated even in small towns and villages, Hindenburg Day revolved around voluntary associations and relied on the energies ofprivate citizens. Parades composed by various clubs and associations and joined by artisans, employees, Christian workers, and women's groups; large market-square rallies; and private gestures such as patriotic window dressing and the display of blackwhite-red flags-all conveyed the heart-felt jubilation of burghers. These celebrations resembled agemiitlich summer carnival or Schiitzenfist of national proportions, and had little in common with the careful choreography of prewar Founding Day or Sedan Day ceremonies; there were no strict social divisions between invited guests and passersby, no reviewing stands for municipal notables, and no fancy dress balls. 51 Burghers themselves composed the spectacle. National feeling was as high as it was because Hindenburg festivity mustered and esteemed burghers of all social stations and at the same time presented a united front against the working-class Left. Hindenburg's Berlin, where Germany's first popularly elected president was inaugurated on 12 May 1925, was no longer the imperial capital of the prewar years. To Otto Kunze, a columnist for Munich's Allgemeine Rundschau who had strenuously protested Hindenburg's candidacy, the festivity resembled "the procession of a kaiser or a king" before 19 I 4 -"and yet it was very different. " Kunze explained:
The crowds, garlands, and flags were the same. The color composition black-white-red set the tone then as it did now. The cordons were also just like before 1914. But back then the cordons were essential. They divided spectators and principals. Outside the masses in their everyday clothes ... inside a private party with . . . court dress and livery, medals and insignia 51. This impression comes from a reading ofvarious Braunschweig newspapers for the period whose fine differences few understood.... The whole thing was pure theater! Metropolis and court had become two worlds.
Hindenburg's inauguration offered significant contrasts to this prewar picture of privilege and rank. Hindenburg entered Berlin "in an automobile surrounded by police on rnotorcycles. Guests wore normal evening dress." And the cheering masses were not excluded from the ceremony, but played important roles as they gathered along the parade route. Democratic scale rather than monarchical pomp gave the ceremony its grandeur: "The procession stretched in a straight line for seven kilometers; a million people were up and about; patriotic associations lined the route with two hundred thousand men; the sky was full of airplanes trailing streamers. "52 Other visitors commented as well on "the authentic and genuine enthusiasm" they had witnessed in the capital. 53 Burghers celebrated a patriotic J701kifest, comparable to the Fourth ofJuly or Bastille Day. Nationalism had become volkstumlich and more socially embracing, something many critics felt miss·· ing in the stage-management of national holidays before the war. 54 Kunze's description accompanied photographs and drawings of Hindenburg in which the national hero is framed by the exuberant crowds. Published in the popular family weekly magazine, Die Woche, one watercolor depicted Hindenburg's unruly procession through the Brandenburg Gate; the happy crowds and unmanaged celebration in the foreground vie with Hindenburg himself for the viewer's attention. In the drawings, workers cheer alongside well-to-do burghers; caps are waved beside top hats. The serried ranks of military guards and quiet protocol of prewar ceremony is entirely missing from these pictures, which show noisy disorder and excited gestures. People are waving and pushing and running. 55 Simplicissimu5 quickly recognized this novel role of the crowd and joked about whether President Hindenburg would, in the course of his term, eventually come to meet every German personally. Adopting the familiar phrases of the en- tertainment world, Gerhard Schultze-Pfaelzer, Hindenburg's press spokesman before 1925, went so far as to call Hindenburg a "darling of the people. "56 It was in deference to the requirements of more democratic politics after war and revolution that so many commentators fastened on Hindenburg's appeal to the crowd. A successful nationalist movement had to be composed by populist gestures and had to look forward to a more integrative and hospitable community, and could not simply content itselfwith simple-minded rhetoric about Versailles or corrupt republican functionaries.
Hindenburg ceremony in the 1920S reminds historians that there was a basic political coherence to the Protestant Biirgertum. Well before the onset of the "Great Depression," disparate social and economic constituents -employees, Christian workers, artisans, farmers, and professionals -had come together to collaborate in political endeavors. Marching beneath the black-white-red flags of the Kaiserreich, displaying their numbers to alarmed socialists, applauding the patriotic entertainment provided by neighborhood clubs, they recognized themselves as political allies. To be sure, burghers never repudiated their own occupational interests or fine social distinctions on Hindenburg's account. Hindenburg did not impose a political settlement on postwar social and economic conflict. As the 1920S closed, an array of small single-interest parties appealing to homeowners, creditors, artisans, and employees attracted more and more votes in local and then national elections. By the time of the 1928 Reichstag elections, splinter parties garnered more than 14 percent ofthe national vote. To many observers, the impact of inflation and stabilization had grated the Weimar polity into tiny special interest fragments. 57 During the same period, the Biirgerblock coalition in Berlin fell apart over the issue of the Locarno Treaty in October 1925. Rejoined in January 1927, it remained a rickety structure and finally collapsed little more than a year later. As a result, relations between the DVP and DNVP 1925 arzd 1932 became impossibly bad. Nonetheless, party strife and divisive special interest politics did not disassemble completely the local Biirgertum. Hindenburg Days and Stahlhelm activity mustered social clubs and civic resources and practiced burghers in the ways and means of nationalist unity.
The Hindenburg Elections of
This sort of grass-roots festivity provided important examples of what could be accomplished even if actual achievements often fell short of public expectations. A durable DVP-DNVP Biirgerblock that was at once hospitable to middle-class constituencies and vigilantly antisocialist never came to pass. This sort ofpolitical unity had to await the Nazis. But with Hindenburg, the provincial Stadtbild of Weimar Germany changed considerably. For Social Democrats, the town square had become more contested and morc dangerous; nationalist parades often ended with socialists intimidated in local taverns or beat up in alleyways. Burghers, by contrast, came to see their neighborhoods, embellished as they were in black-white-red, in increasingly familiar terms. This was so not only because patriotic rallies and victory marches seemed to establish a nationalist claim on public spaces but also because burghers participated in Hindenburg festivities in a popular and informal manner. Political confidence and public poise distinguished the small-town Burgertum, not nostalgia and despair. For all the reactionary speechmaking they occasioned against the Weimar Republic, Hindenburg Days indicated fundamental shifts in the political capacities and popular expectations of Protestant burghers. Community support for Hindenburg did not translate into automatic support for other right-wing efforts such as the plebiscitarian campaign against the Young Plan in autumn 1929 or the Harzburg Front in October 193 I (which were too party-political in any case). Only the Nazis were able to reassemble the sturdy neighborhood coalitions which had backed Hindenburg, at first incompletely in September 1930, then much more successfully in the various 1932 elections. But garnering overproportional support where Hindenburg had been especially strong in 1925, the Nazis succeeded by drawing on earlier traditions of nationalist mobilization and by remaining faithful to the popular style and fraternal sense of participation that distinguished Hindenburg festivity. Hardly a nostalgic remnant of another era, the popular coalition behind I-Endenburg provided a glimpse of the kind of nationalist fusion to come. Of course this question cannot be answered directly or beyond any reasonable doubt, since we do not have any methodologically reliable and representative opinion polls tor the Weimar period. What we can do, however, is to look first at the statistical relationship between the Hindenburg vote and the vote of other parties and candidates at the level of the 1, 200 German counties and cities of that period. The results are statistically sound if we restrict the verbal interpretation of our findings to the territorial, that is, the county, leveL Since we are, however, much more interested in individual-level relationships, I will try, in a second-statistically somewhat risky-step, to discern the underlying (but unknown) "true" voting transitions to and from Hindenburg by means of multiple ecological regression analysis. 1 The correlation coefficient therefore is positive in sign and rather high in magnitude. This is the case for the statistical association between the Hi.ndenburg vote on the one hand, and the vote for the German National 2. For some formal aspects of this data set which contains about 1,200 cases and more than 700 variables see Dirk Hanisch, "Inhalt und Struktur der Datenbank 'Wahl-und Sozialdaten der Kreise und Gemeinden des Deutschen Reiches von 1920 -1933 , '" Historical Social Research 14 (1989 : 39-67. The ICPSR data set on Weimar elections unfortwlately has some serious shortcomings which make it not advisable to use it without m'\ior revisions. SeeJiirgen W Falter and WolfD. Gmner, "Minor and Major Flaws ofa Widely Used Data Set: The ICPSR 'German Weimar Republic Data 1919 -1933 ' under Scmtiny," Historical Social Research 6 (1981 : 1-26. in a county, the higher, on the average, the DNVP or Jarres vote was in that same county. The opposite applies to candidates who won relatively more votes in the first than in the subsequent Hindenburg quintiles, as is the case with Wilhelm Marx, his close competitor of 1925. The correlation coefficient still is comparatively high, but now of course negative in sign. We thus find out that German Nationalists and the 1924 coalition of volkisch and national-socialist splinters, as well as Jarres, displayed the same distribution of votes as Hindenburg did: they fared much better, on the average, in counties where Hindenburg was strong than in counties where Hindenburg was weak. For example, in the 165 counties of the first quintile, the Jarres vote amounted to not more than 1 I. 8 percent of the electorate, while in the fifth quintile, theJarres vote was up to 45.5 percent. In addition, there is a slight, curvilinear relationship between the Hindenburg vote and each of the following: turnout; the vote for the first-ballot candidate of the volkisch Right, Erich von Ludendorff; and, quite unexpectedly, the vote for the firstballot presidential candidate of the Social Democrats, Otto Braun.
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Some party-vote correlations of the 1925 Hindenburg vote
Some ecological regression estimates of the "true" voterfluctuations to andfrom Paul von Hindenburg in 1925
It would be quite hazardous to interpret these findings in terms of individual or group relationships-to assume, that is, that all or most Hindenburg voters were necessarily former Jarres and DNVP voters. So-called ecological fallacies, such as the erroneous assumption that the relationships of one level of analysis would be equivalent to the other, could (but by no means necessarily must) result from such a tacit assumption of congruence. 3 To get somewhat better estimates of voter fluctuations, one has to take into consideration the development of the other parties or candidates as well. This is done by multiple ecological regression analysis-a powerful but somewhat dangerous statistical technique that bases its estimates on rather "strong" distributional premises such as linearity, non-contextuality of relationships, etc. Only if these premises are met by the data (which we cannot fully know) can the estimates of ecological regression equations be inter- Tables 3 and 4 report some ecological regression estimates of the voter fluctuations to and from Hindenburg. The cell entries represent percentages. The first column of numbers of Table 3 informs about the transition probability ofthe December 1924 Reichstag voters from the parties indicated at the left of the table to Hindenburg. According to these estimates, between three-quarters and four-fifths of all rightwing voters (i.e., NSFB, DNVP, DVP, and various splinter parties) of December 1924 seem to have supported their joint second-ballot presidential candidate, Hindenburg. From the other parties and the nonvoters, only a rather insignificant minority seems to have voted for Hindenburg. The flux of voters from the various candidates of the first ballot to Hindenburg which is reported in the first column of Table 4 seems to follow the same pattern: almost all of the Jarres supporters joined the Hindenburg camp in the second round, while almost no fluctuation existed between Braun and Marx on the one hand and von Hindenburg on the other. : 1928 -1933 ," in Thomas Childers, ed., The Formation of the Nazi Constitllency 1919 -1933 (London, 1986 If we assume for the moment that we can fully trust our ecological regression estimates, about every sixth Hindenburg voter of 1925 voted DNVP in 1928, and every fourth seems to have voted SPD. The latter result, which at first sight looks quite contraintuitive, was probably due to the influx of new voters into the SPD in 1928 -voters who, according to other ecological regression findings, seem to have voted DNVP in 1924 (and consequently Hindenburg in 1925 and probably defected to the Nazis after 1928. The current findings suggest that about 20 percent of former Hindenburg partisans voted for the Nazis in 1930-a number that accounts for almost half of the NSDAP electorate ofthat year. Other parties, with the quite plausible exception Wahlverhalten 1919 -1933 (Munich, 1986 for Bavaria, while Table 6 displays transition probabilities. The effects of the BVP's recommendation for Hindenburg are clearly discernible. On the first ballot, Jarres got only 6 percent of the eligible voters in that 20 percent of the Bavarian counties where the BVP vote of the previous December was highest; the overall correlation coefficient is rather strong and negative in sign ( -0.74) . By contrast, Hindenburg was able to collect 40 percent of the electorate in the heaviest BVP (and first-ballot Held) precincts. By the same token, Marx won many fewer votes here than might have been expected. Table 6 indicates that approximately 60 percent of the first-ballot Held partisans followed their party's recommendation and voted for Hindenburg on the second ballot, compared to only about 20 percent who switched to Marx. This would indeed imply that about half a million votes could be attributed to the BVP's unfortunate recommendation. In the light of Hindenburg's past political record, the BVP's electoral policy may be characterized as shortsighted if not frivolous. Table 7 , reveal the radical rearrangement undergone by the Hindenburg voting coalition. In 1925, the Hindenburg vote was lower in predominantly Catholic, in urban, industrialized districts, and in regions where unemployment was above average. By contrast, the Hindenburg vote of 1932 increased with the number of Catholics and self-employed in the district. And Hitler's constituency of 1932, like Hindenburg's of 1925, was located in predominantly Protestant counties, in rural areas, and in districts with lower than average unemployment rates. 8 The information presented in Table 7 is bivariate in character: only two variables are compared at one time. The real world, however, is 8. Quite unexpectedly the Nazis fared much better in districts with low levels of unemployment. On the average, the unemployed seem to have been dearly underrcpresented among Nazi voters. See Jiirgcn W. different: nobody is only Catholic or Protestant, only young or old, only farmer or blue-collar worker. The same is true for the territorial units which form the basis of the analysis: county units are Catholic and rural and predominantly agrarian, etc. To account for this mix of social characteristics, one may combine some of the most important explanatory properties of the counties in a tree comparison (Table 8) . In order to construct such a "tree," we first divide the 831 county units of the Reich into three subgroups according to the percentage of Catholics living in these counties (religious denomination is by far the most important predictor ofthe Hitler and Hindenburg vote in 193 2!). For these three subgroups of counties, we calculate the average percentage of Hindenburg, Hitler, and Marx voters. In the next step the three denominational county classes are then divided according to their degree ofurbanization. Again the average percentage ofHindenburg, Hitler, and Marx voters is calculated for each of the resulting six groups. We thus find, for example, that the Hindenburg vote was far below average in rural Catholic areas in 1925 (23 percent); in 1932, however, Hindenburg was able in these very same counties to mobilize 59 percent of the eligible voters, while Adolf Hitler was able to win only 19 percent of the electorate in this branch of our tree. In the next and fmal step, the resulting six county classes are again divided into three sub-classes each, according to the prevalent economic sector, so that we are now looking at 18 different county categories which are socially and politically more homogeneous than the less differentiated branches of the tree above this last level. We then determine the share of the vote in each of the eighteen branches for the three main contenders of the two elections under consideration. 9 While space constraints prohibit a detailed description, one can readily see from the "tree" that the Hindenburg voting coalition underwent a radical change: the distribution of Hindenburg votes in 1932 is much closer to that of the Marx vote of 1925 Cell entries: percentage of total electorate (rounded). "Catholic" = Catholic >66.6'; "Mixed" = Catholic 33.3 to 66.6%; "Protestant'· = Catholic <33.3%. "Rural" = <50\ of county population living in' conununities with more than 5000 inhabitants; "Urban" = >50'" J..t.V lng in conununities >5000 inhabitants. "Agrarian" = a relative majority of the county population is employed in the agrarian sector of the economy, etc. It is often suggested that the increase in Hitler's constituency (about 2 million votes) during the second ballot ofthe 1932 presidential election may have been largely due to defections from the Communist leader Ernst Thalmann, who lost about I. 2 million votes. This hypothesis, which is based mostly on local impressionistic evidence (the proverbial Communist tavern which changed colors overnight), is rooted in the widespread conviction that ultimately the totalitarian extremes were not so terribly far apart and that the step from the Communists to the Nazis was much more readily taken than ideology or propaganda might lead one to expect. This idea of the proximity of the extremes finds additional theoretical endorsement in the conviction that many, if not most, of Hitler's and Thalmann's followers were unpolitical, socially uprooted products of mass society, so-called protest voters who could easily be seduced by unrealistic promises and who therefore fell prey to the totalitarian temptations of the time. 11 However, little quantitative evidence has ever been provided that would either prove or disprove this transition hypothesis. In Table 9A , the statistical relationship between the percentage point change of the Thalmann and Hitler vote between the first and second ballot of the 1932 presidential election is scrutinized. Again, quintiles and correlation coefficients are examined. In contrast to Tables 2 and  5 , however, we are now looking at so-called change variables, i.e., percentage-point differences of the vote between the first and second ballot. What we fmd is a near-perfect independence of the develop-TO. In fact in the multivariate model the Hindenburg vote of 1925 (which in turn may be interpreted as a proximity measure of a right-wing political tradition) is the second best predictot of the Nazi vote (after the religious composition of the counties)! SeeJilrgen W. Falter and Dirk Hanisch, "Die Anfalligkeit von Arbeitern gegenilber der NSDAP bei den Reichstags\vahlen 1928 -1933 ," Archiv fir Sozialgeschichte 26 (1986 The ecological regression estimates amount to about 13 percent of former Thalmann voters switching to AdolfHitler in the second ballot (see Table 9B ). This would imply that almost 30 percent of the new Hitler voters would indeed have been former Thalmann followers. Another 20 percent of the Thalmann supporters seem to have abstained during the second round of the presidential election. But according to the same ecological regression findings, the vast majority of the new Hitler voters of April 1932-about 60 percent-were former Duesterberg supporters. Again, the voter fluctuation seems to have been more complex and differentiated than is normally assumed. If these ecological regression estimates are correct, then there were a few hundred thousand first-round Thalmann voters who joined the ranks of the Hitler coalition. While they made up neither a majority of Thalmann defectors nor ofnew Hitler recruits, they are sufficiently numerous to give credence to the local events and personal experiences reported in the biographical literature.
Mlhere did the Hindenburg voters go after
